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Abstract—Forensic image recognition is an important tool
in many areas of law enforcement where an agency wants to
prosecute possessors of illegal images. The recognition of illegal
images that might have undergone human imperceptible changes
(e.g., a JPEG-recompression) is commonly done by computing
a perceptual image hash function of a given image and then
matching this hash with perceptual hash values in a database of
previously collected illegal images. To prevent privacy violation,
agencies should only learn about images that have been reliably
detected as illegal and nothing else.
In this work, we argue that the prevalent presence of separate
departments in such agencies can be used to enforce the need-to-
know principle by separating duties among them. This enables us
to construct the first practically efficient architecture to perform
forensic image recognition in a privacy-preserving manner. By
deriving unique cryptographic keys directly from the images, we
can encrypt all sensitive data and ensure that only illegal images
can be recovered by the law enforcement agency while all other
information remains protected.
I. INTRODUCTION
The effective and efficient recognition of digitally stored
data received much attention in the past [6], [10], [16], [17],
[19], [20] or [22]. One of its main applications lies in the area
of law enforcement where forensic data recognition helps in
the prosecution of criminals. A common workflow of forensic
investigations starts with a police force entering a private house
and reading out all data stored on any data media found.
Then, a separate department of the police station performs a
matching of the found data with a collection of known illegal
data. In practice, the matching is usually done by comparing
cryptographic hash values of this data which reliably detects
even a single bit change.
Regarding images, however, we are generally not interested
in bit changes. For instance, a JPEG-recompressed image will
have a completely different cryptographic hash value than the
original image, while the two images are indistinguishable
for the human eye. Consequently, we are rather interested
in human imperceptible changes than single bit flips when
dealing with digital images. A so-called perceptual hash
function [11] is an efficient mean to detect these changes:
perceptually similar images will produce similar hash values
WIFS‘2012, December, 2-5, 2012, Tenerife, Spain.
978-1-4673-2287-4/12/$31.00    c©2012 IEEE.
(e.g., with a small Hamming distance), while perceptually
different images will produce hash values with a large Ham-
ming distance. In the past, such hash functions have been
successfully exploited in the area of law enforcement. For
instance, Steinebach et al. [22] consider a scenario where a
police force wants to prosecute criminals possessing images
with child pornographic content. Concretely this is done by
first computing perceptual hash values of all images found
on any data media owned by the investigated person and
then matching these hash values with a database consisting
of perceptual hash values of previously collected illegal child
pornographic images. Whenever the (Hamming) distance of
an investigated hash value with a hash value in the database is
below a certain image recognition threshold t, the investigated
image will be detected as illegal.
This setting can be formulated in more general terms: two
independent departments of a law enforcement agency work
together in order to prosecute possessors of images with illegal
content. The first department starts the investigation by using
a device, which we call the preprocessing device. This device
has direct/physical access to the data media storing (private)
images and performs some preprocessing on the original
data (in [22], this device simply copies all data to another
data media, like a hard disk). Thereafter, a matching device
of the second department, with access to the preprocessed
data from the preprocessing device (and not to the original,
unprocessed data), matches each preprocessed data item with
a previously generated database containing illegal images in
order to recognize illegal content.
In such settings, all data (including very sensitive data) is
available to both departments in the clear, which poses a huge
violation to the investigated person’s privacy. Assume, for
instance, that the suspect possesses no illegal data whatsoever,
still both departments will have access to all his data (including
his most sensitive data) although he is completely innocent.
From a privacy perspective, this circumstance is utterly unac-
ceptable.
In this work, we present a simple and efficient solution
to prosecute a suspect in the above setting, while preserving
the suspect’s privacy on sensitive data which is unrelated
to the actual criminal case. We argue that by separating
duties among the two existing departments (the preprocessing
and the matching device) of the law enforcement agency,
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we can enforce the need-to-know principle and thus reduce
privacy risks to a minimum. Since all our techniques can be
implemented in copying hardware, it makes sense to treat the
preprocessing device as a trusted party with physical access to
the suspect’s data, which sanitizes the original data from all
sensitive information. Note that in practice there is always a
party (preprocessing device) with direct access to the suspect’s
data, so we are forced to trust this party. The preprocessed
(sanitized) data can then securely been given to the untrusted
matching device which only learns about the reliably detected
illegal images owned by the suspect and nothing else. To prove
the practical efficiency of our solution, we give a proof-of-
concept implementation and evaluate its performance.
Related Work. Concerning the construction and use of per-
ceptual hash functions in different scenarios, we refer to [20]
for an overview on techniques. Most interesting for our pur-
poses is the work by Steinebach et al. [22] (and the references
therein) that successfully uses perceptual hash functions in the
area of law enforcement.
We note that our work heavily relies on a cryptographic
primitive, called Fuzzy Extractor [9]. This primitive reliably
extracts a uniformly random key from a biometric input
together with certain helper data, which later on assists in
reconstructing the same key without knowing the original
input. Fuzzy extractors have been extensively used in the
area of biometric template protection [12] (and [21]), while
paying much attention to iris-based [7] (and [8]), fingerprint-
based [14] (and [15]), and face-based [23] templates.
Outline. We recall the basic building blocks used for our con-
struction in Section II and present our protocol for the privacy-
preserving image recognition in Section III. Implementation
details are dealt with in Section IV, where we will also discuss
concrete parameter choices for our construction. We conclude
with potential further application scenarios in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We make use of the following four building blocks: cryp-
tographic hash functions, perceptual hash functions, fuzzy ex-
tractors, and symmetric-key encryption. As usual [18, Ch. 1.9],
we call a hash function cHr : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}r (r ∈ N
fixed) cryptographic if it is pre-image resistant, collision resis-
tant, and unpredictable. We treat cryptographic hash functions
cHr as random oracles [5] which ensures that the outputs are
uniformly distributed in {0, 1}r.
Perceptual Hash Functions. We define a perceptual (im-
age)1 hash function as a deterministic compression function
pHtn : {0, 1}
∗ −→ {0, 1}n such that perceptually similar
images yield outputs with a small Hamming distance2, say
≤ t. So two given images img
1
and img
2
are perceptually
similar if ∆H(pHtn(img1), pH
t
n
(img
2
)) ≤ t where ∆H(·, ·)
1Note that perceptual hash functions can be defined for different kinds of
media objects and not only for images. In this work, however, we are only
interested in perceptual hash functions with respect to images.
2We focus on the Hamming distance here, although other distance functions
can be used.
denotes the Hamming distance function. There are numerous
instantiations of such perceptual hash functions (see [25] for an
overview) which are based on different techniques. For more
details on perceptual hash functions, we refer to [20].
We stress that perceptual hash functions are error-prone
depending on the size of the image recognition threshold t:
perceptual hashes of perceptually similar images may have a
Hamming distance greater than t and will thus be detected as
different (false rejection), while the hashes of perceptually dif-
ferent images may have a Hamming distance smaller or equal
to t and will thus be detected as similar (false acceptance).
For greater choices of t, we will have a lower false rejection
rate (FRR) but a higher false acceptance rate (FAR), and
vice versa. When applying perceptual hash functions in areas
where the detection of illegal images has serious consequence
(e.g., in the area of law enforcement), we need to make sure
that detected images are crosschecked by the human eye.
Furthermore, it is not necessary to detect all illegal images
but “sufficiently many” for criminal conviction.
Fuzzy Extractors. As explained in the previous paragraph,
a perceptual hash function will not produce the same hash
value for preceptually similar images but will produce values
having a small (pairwise) Hamming distance of ≤ t. A Fuzzy
Extractor (FE) [9] offers a way to circumvent this issue:
for a given perceptual hash of an image, the FE produces
a uniformly random string K together with a certain public
helper data h in an enrolment phase. Later on, this helper data
can be used in a reconstruction phase to produce the same
string K when given the perceptual hash of an image that is
perceptually similar to the original image. It is important to
note that the string K remains uniformly random even when
given the helper data h. Concretely, an FE can be instantiated
as follows:
In a setup phase, an error-correcting binary3 linear [µ, k, d]-
code C of bit length µ, cardinality 2k, and minimum distance
d is chosen. Due to the choice of parameters, the code can
correct up to
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
errors. There are many known ways to
construct such codes for given parameters [9]. When applying
the FE to perceptual hash values in {0, 1}n, we need to make
sure that the bit length µ of the code C coincides with the
bit length n of the output of the hash function, and that the
number
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
of correctable errors is greater or equal to the
image recognition threshold t of the perceptual hash function.
In the enrolment phase, denoted by FE.Gen, given a per-
ceptual hash value pHt
n
(img) of an image img, we choose a
codeword γ ∈ C uniformly at random and compute the helper
data h as h = γ ⊕ pHtn(img). In order to get a uniformly
random string K , we apply a cryptographic hash function
cHr : {0, 1}
∗ −→ {0, 1}r to γ, i.e., K = cHr(γ).
Later, during the reconstruction phase (denoted by FE.Rep),
for any given perceptual hash value pHtn(img′) of Hamming
distance ≤ t with pHt
n
(img) (i.e., img′ and img are per-
ceptually similar) and given helper data h (corresponding to
3We restrict our attention to binary codes (i.e., codes over the binary Galois
field F2). However, the same discussion can also be done for non-binary codes.
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pHtn(img)), we first compute W := pHtn(img′)⊕ h, and then
use the decoding algorithm of the error correcting code C on
W , which outputs the same codeword γ that we randomly
picked in the enrolment phase. Then, applying cHr to this
codeword, we reconstruct the string K = cHr(γ).
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING IMAGE RECOGNITION
The Setting. We recall the abstract scenario set forth in
Section I:
• Given a data media M storing all kinds of images, a
matching of these images with a database D consisting of
illegal images is to be performed. As described in Section
I, such matchings are very important in the area of law
enforcement.
• A trusted preprocessing device with physical access to
M performs some preprocessing on the images stored
on M.
• A separate untrusted matching device receives the prepro-
cessed data from the preprocessing device with no access
to the original data media M and matches this data with
the database D in order to detect illegal images in the
preprocessed data.
• The goal is to make the matching process privacy-
preserving: The matching device should only learn those
images that are reliably detected to be illegal and no other
information.
High-Level Description of our Construction. Recall that
we want to enforce the need-to-know principle by separating
duties among the preprocessing and the matching device.
Consequently, each device should only learn the information it
really needs to know. Since the preprocessing device is trusted,
we require it to modify the original data media M in such
a way that the resulting preprocessed data poses no privacy
threat when giving it to the untrusted matching device. Before
any processing is done at all, there is an initial setup that sets
up the following building blocks:
• a perceptual hash function pHt
n
: {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}n of
bit length n and image recognition threshold t,
• an error-correcting binary linear [µ, k, d]-code C such that
µ = n and
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
≥ t (used in the FE),
• a cryptographic hash function cHr : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}r
of bit length r such that r ≤ k (used in the FE)4, and
• a symmetric-key encryption scheme with encryption
function Enc and decryption function Dec that can han-
dle variable sized plaintext messages, along with a key
derivation function KDF for this particular encryption
scheme. We denote encryption of a message m under
a symmetric key K by EncK(m) and decryption of a
ciphertext c under K by DecK(c).
4We require that r ≤ k since we want the output of the FE to be uniformly
random. Recall that the FE will apply the cryptographic hash function to a
uniformly random codeword. This codeword is drawn from an n-bit code with
2k different codewords, meaning that a randomly chosen n-bit codeword will
have k bits of entropy. So requiring r ≤ k ensures an entropy of r bits in
the output of the hash function.
We give concrete instantiations of the above building blocks
in Section IV. Now, on a high-level, we let the preprocessing
device perform the following steps for each image img on the
media M:
1) Compute the perceptual hash pHt
n
(img) and give it as
input to an algorithm that we call the sanitizer.
2) On input the perceptual hash pHtn(img), the sanitizer
outputs a cryptographic key K (for the symmetric-
key encryption scheme), helper data h, and a sani-
tized version of the perceptual hash that we denote by
SpHr(img). This sanitized version is completely free of
all private information stored in img (in fact, we will
see that it is indistinguishable from a uniformly random
string).
3) The cryptographic key K is then used in the symmetric-
key encryption function Enc in order to encrypt the
image img itself and some potential meta-data meta
which may include the filename, path information, or
other file information such as timestamps, attributes, etc.
4) The encrypted image (and meta-data) EncK(img,meta),
the helper data h, and the sanitized perceptual hash
SpHr(img) is the preprocessed data which can now
safely be given to the untrusted matching device (e.g.,
on an external hard disk).
These steps are depicted in Figure 1 on the left hand side of
the dashed “separation of duty”-line (preprocessing device).
Once the preprocessing device processed all images on the
data media M in the above described steps, the untrusted
matching device performs the following steps for each pre-
processed image data (EncK(img,meta), h, SpHr(img)):
1) For each illegal image in the public database D, an
extractor uses the helper data h in order to com-
pute a hash-extract hext that is then matched (in a
matching algorithm) with the sanitized perceptual hash
SpHr(img) from the preprocessed image data in a
privacy-preserving manner.
2) The matching algorithm takes the sanitized perceptual
hash SpHr(img) and the hash-extract hext as input and
computes a cryptographic key K ′. If the matching was
successful, the key K ′ coincides with the symmetric key
K under which the image img and the meta-data meta
was encrypted, and so this data can be recovered simply
by decrypting. If the matching failed, the whole process
starts all over again, taking the next illegal image of the
database D as input.
For a pictorial overview on these steps, see the right hand side
of the dashed “separation of duty”-line (matching device) in
Figure 1.
We note that encryption (in the preprocessing) and decryp-
tion (in the matching) are actually not needed for the matching
to work (the sanitized perceptual hashes and the helper data
are sufficient). Still, we include these two procedures in order
for the matching device to crosscheck the suspected illegal
images by the human eye (recall that perceptual hash functions
are error-prone, see Section II).
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Fig. 1. Pictorial high-level description of our construction.
In the following, we give the technical details of the three
main algorithms used in the above steps: the sanitizer at the
preprocessing device, as well as the extractor and the matching
at the matching device.
The Sanitizer. The sanitizer algorithm takes a perceptual hash
pHtn(img) of an image img as input and outputs a crypto-
graphic key K (for the symmetric-key encryption scheme),
helper data h, and a sanitized version SpHr(img) of the per-
ceptual hash pHt
n
(img). The output is computed as described
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Sanitizer
Input: pHt
n
(img)
Output: K , h, SpHr(img)
1: (h, γ, SpHr(img))←− FE.Gen(pH
t
n
(img))
// helper data h, codeword γ, and SpHr(img) = cHr(γ)
2: K ←− KDF (γ)
3: Output (K,h, SpHr(img))
The Extractor. The extractor algorithm takes helper data h
(corresponding to an image img) and the perceptual hash
pHtn(imgill) of an illegal image imgill of the public database
D as input and outputs the hash-extract hext. The hash-
extract consists of two components. The first component is
a codeword that essentially is a “correction” of the perceptual
hash of img
ill
by using h that can be used to recover the
decryption key if imgill is perceptually similar to img. The
second component is the cryptographic hash function cHr
applied to this “correction”, which transforms it into a format
so that it can be easily matched with the suspected sanitized
hash pHt
n
(img) of img later on in the matching algorithm. The
individual steps of this procedure are described in Algorithm 2.
The Matching. The matching algorithm takes a sanitized
perceptual hash SpHr(img) and a hash-extract hext as input
Algorithm 2 Extractor
Input: h, pHt
n
(img
ill
)
Output: hext
1: (γill, hashill)←− FE.Rep(pH
t
n(imgill))
// codeword γill and hashill = cHr(γill)
2: hext←− (γill, hashill)
3: Output hext
and outputs either a cryptographic key K ′ or the symbol ⊥.
The key K ′ will coincide with the decryption K if and only if
the matching was successful. This is done by performing the
steps of Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Matching
Input: SpHr(img), hext = (γill, hashill)
Output: K ′ or ⊥
1: if SpHr(img) = hashill then
2: K ′ ←− KDF(γill)
3: else
4: K ′ ←− ⊥
5: end if
6: Output K ′
Correctness and Security. Assume that the preprocess-
ing device finished its computation for a given image
img (with meta-data meta) and sends the resulting triplet
(EncK(img,meta), h, SpHr(img)) to the matching device. For
each image imgill in the public database D of illegal images,
we have the following distinction of cases:
1) The image img is perceptually similar to the illegal
image imgill. This means that the Hamming distance
between the perceptual hashes of the two images img
and imgill is less or equal to the image recognition
threshold t. By the properties of the FE (cf. Section II),
the algorithm FE.Rep(pHt
n
(imgill)) will produce the
82
same codeword γ as the algorithm FE.Gen(pHtn(img))
since the used error-correcting code C corrects all t
errors and will decode to the same codeword γ. This
implies that hashill = SpHr(img) and so the output
hext of the extractor coincides with (γ, SpHr(img)).
This in turn means that the IF-statement in the matching
algorithm evaluates to TRUE and thus produces the
key K ′ = KDF(γ). Obviously, we have K ′ = K
and so the matching device can successfully decrypt
EncK(img,meta).
2) The image img is perceptually different from the illegal
image imgill. This means that the Hamming distance
between the perceptual hashes of the two images img
and imgill is greater than the image recognition thresh-
old t. Then, the decoding of pHt
n
(img
ill
)⊕ h will yield
a codeword γill that is different from γ (see also [9]).
Therefore, the hash value hashill = cHr(γill) will differ
from SpHr(img) and the IF-statement in the matching
algorithm will evaluate to FALSE and thus output the
symbol ⊥. In this case, decryption of EncK(img,meta)
is impossible. This is ensured by the security properties
of the FE (cf. [9]): Without knowing a perceptual hash
that is within a Hamming distance of ≤ t to pHt
n
(img),
the hash pHt
n
(img) (and its corresponding image img)
stays information-theoretically hidden.
We stress that the only information the untrusted matching
device sees is the triplet (EncK(img,meta), h, SpHr(img)).
The first component is a secure encryption and is hence
indistinguishable from a uniformly random value. The second
two components (h, SpHr(img)) are indistinguishable from
random as well by the properties of the FE (cf. Section II). As
the preprocessing device is trusted, this shows that our protocol
indeed is privacy-preserving in the sense that if an image is
perceptually different from all illegal images in the databaseD,
the matching device learns no information whatsoever, except
for a couple of uniformly random strings (independent of the
original image).
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Instantiating the Protocol. We instantiate the building blocks
needed in our protocol, as described in Section III, as follows:
• As perceptual hash function pHtn : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}n
of bit length n and image recognition threshold t, we
use the block mean value based hash function by Yang
et al. [24] with parameters n = 960 and t = 12 for
efficiency and implementation reasons (more precisely,
we use the second method proposed in [24]). Note that
this particular hash function has been successfully used
to recognize images in the forensic context [22]. Therein,
they evaluated that an image recognition threshold of t =
12 suffices to reliably identify illegal images with an FRR
of ≈ 4.6% and an FAR of ≈ 0% when working with a
sample set of certain “cheerleading event” images (see
“performance analysis” below for more details). In our
actual implementation, we rely on the open source library
pHash [4] that provides an efficient implementation of
this block mean value based hash function. The computed
hashes have the fixed bit length of n = 960 bits. We note
that in order to handle compressed image formats, the
pHash library uses the open source CImg Library [1] for
image processing.
• We instantiate the FE with the recommended parameter
setting of [9] and rely on the recommended (freely
available) implementation by Morelos-Zaragoza [2] of an
error-correcting binary linear [µ, k, d]-code C such that
µ = n and
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
≥ t. More precisely, [2] implements
a [µ = 960, k = 840, d = 25]-BCH code along with an
efficient decoding algorithm.
• As cryptographic hash function cHr : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}r
of bit length r such that r ≤ k, we use SHA512 from
the Mhash library [3], i.e., r = 512 ≤ k = 840. Together
with our choice of the error-correcting code, we get a
secure instantiation of the FE (cf. [9]).
• As a symmetric-key encryption scheme that can han-
dle variable sized plaintext messages, we use a stan-
dard binary additive stream cipher [18] and use the
PKCS#1 [13, Appendix B.2.1] mask generation function
(i.e., a keystream generator for the used stream cipher)
MGFℓ : {0, 1}
∗ −→ {0, 1}ℓ as the key derivation
function KDF, where ℓ is a second input and is chosen
as the bit length of the message to be encrypted.
Performance Analysis. With the above described instantiation
of the protocol, the performance depends on the number L of
images processed by the preprocessing device and the number
I of illegal perceptual hash values stored in the public database
D. We analyzed the performance of the preprocessing device
and the matching device separately, and ran all tests on an
MS Windows XP Professional system with an Intel Core 2
Duo Processor E8400 running at 3 GHz. As sample images,
we took 4,400 images of “cheerleading events” (which have
similar characteristics as pornographic images) saved in JPEG
format with file sizes ranging from 9 KB to 44 KB. We
computed the perceptual hashes of the first I = 2, 200 of
these images and stored the hashes in the database D. We
then constructed a “fake criminal” by storing all L = 4, 400
images, JPEG-recompressed with a scaling factor that ensured
the larger edge to be 300 pixels long, meaning an average
size reduction of 25% compared to the original images and
JPEG quality factor of 20 in a dedicated folder on the system.
This is the same set of images and modifications used in the
evaluation of [22]. This allowed us to verify their result that
shows an FRR of ≈ 10% and an FAR of ≈ 0% with an image
recognition threshold of t = 8, while we have an FRR of
≈ 4% and an FAR of ≈ 0% with t = 12.
For the preprocessing device, computing the perceptual hash
of a given image took the most amount of time: 107.98ms (on
average). The whole process of computing the preprocessed
data (EncK(img,meta), h, SpHr(img)) including the storage
of this data in a separate folder took 111.93ms per image (on
average). In total, the preprocessing device needed 8.2 minutes
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for all images.
For the matching device, the running time will depend on
whether a given image is perceptually similar to an image in
the database D and where the corresponding illegal image is
positioned in the database. Therefore, we decided to give an
upper bound on the running time of the matching device by
considering only images that cannot be found in the database
and so we always have to do a matching with all illegal images
in the database per given suspected image. Recall that the only
difference between running the protocol with a legal image
and running it with an illegal image, is that we compute the
key derivation function KDF in the matching algorithm. To
capture the running time of this as well, we included a “fake”
call of KDF with a random codeword. The timing results of
this analysis are summarized in Table I.
# of suspected
images (L)
# of images
in D (I)
total time,
in min
avg. time/susp.
img, in ms
2,200 2,200 15.83 431.69
2,200 6,600 47.34 1,291.08
4,400 2,200 31.59 430.79
4,400 6,600 94.78 1,292.41
4,400 13,200 189.34 2,581.91
TABLE I
RUNNING TIMES OF THE MATCHING DEVICE FOR DIFFERENT AMOUNTS OF
LEGAL AND ILLEGAL IMAGES. THE AMOUNT OF 2,200 LEGAL (L) AND
ILLEGAL (I) IMAGES HAS BEEN ADAPTED TO THE RESPECTIVE AMOUNT
BY DUPLICATING OR REMOVING RANDOMLY CHOSEN IMAGES THEREOF.
We note that the average time for a matching of a given
suspected image and a given perceptual hash in the database
D is 0.2ms.
V. CONCLUSION
In scenarios, where two departments of a law enforcement
agency work together to prosecute possessors of illegal images
(e.g., with child pornographic content as in the setting of [22]),
we argued that very sensitive data (including data that is not
even related to the actual criminal case) will be given to the
agency in the clear, thus posing a huge privacy violation. To
circumvent this, we introduced a protocol that exploits the
existence of two separate departments in order to perform the
image recognition in a privacy-preserving manner. We have
seen that the protocol runs efficiently on our chosen sample
images which makes it employable in real-world scenarios.
The basic idea of our protocol for privacy-preserving image
recognition is not limited to the actual use of images. In fact,
there are a lot more examples where law enforcement agencies
need access to private data of suspected persons, but they are
juridically not allowed to see data which is not relevant to the
criminal case. One example for this lies in the area of illegal
bank transactions. Of course, a different type of “robust” hash
that is tailored to bank transactions would be required in order
to challenge this problem. We leave this as interesting future
work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was funded by Hessen ModellProjekte (HA-
project 243/10-19) within LOEWE — Landes-Offensive zur
Entwicklung Wissenschaftlich-o¨konomischer Exzellenz.
REFERENCES
[1] The cimg library: A c++ template image processing toolkit. http://cimg.
sourceforge.net/.
[2] Implementation of a [960, 840, 25]-bch code. http://www.eccpage.com/
bch3.c/.
[3] Mhash: An open source hash library. http://mhash.sourceforge.net/.
[4] Phash: the open source perceptual hash library. http://www.phash.org/.
[5] Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A
paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In CCS ’93, pages 62–73.
ACM, 1993.
[6] Sushil K. Bhattacharjee and Martin Kutter. Compression tolerant image
authentication. In ICIP (1), pages 435–439, 1998.
[7] George I. Davida, Yair Frankel, and Brian J. Matt. On enabling
secure applications through off-line biometric identification. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 148–157. IEEE, 1998.
[8] George I. Davida, Yair Frankel, Brian J. Matt, and Ren Peralta. On the
relation of error correction and cryptography to an off line biometric
based identification scheme. In Proc. of WCC99, pages 129–138, 1999.
[9] Yevgeniy Dodis, Rafail Ostrovsky, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam Smith.
Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other
noisy data. SIAM J. Comput., 38(1):97–139, 2008.
[10] Jiri Fridrich. Robust bit extraction from images. In ICMCS, Vol. 2,
pages 536–540, 1999.
[11] Jiri Fridrich. Robust hash functions for digital watermarking. In
ITCC’00, pages 178–183. IEEE, 2000.
[12] Anil K. Jain, Karthik Nandakumar, and Abhishek Nagar. Biometric
template security. EURASIP J. Adv. Sig. Proc., 2008, 2008.
[13] RSA Laboratories. PKCS # 1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard, 2002.
[14] Qiming Li and Ee-Chien Chang. Robust, short and sensitive authenti-
cation tags using secure sketch. In MM&Sec’06, pages 56–61, 2006.
[15] Qiming Li, Muchuan Guo, and Ee-Chien Chang. Fuzzy extractors for
asymmetric biometric representations. In IEEE Workshop on Biometrics
(in association with CVPR), pages 1–6. IEEE, 2008.
[16] Ching-Yung Lin and Shih-Fu Chang. A robust image authentication
method distinguishing jpeg compression from malicious manipulation.
IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Techn., 11(2):153–168, 2001.
[17] Albert Meixner and Andreas Uhl. Robustness and security of a wavelet-
based cbir hashing algorithm. In MM&Sec, pages 140–145. ACM, 2006.
[18] Alfred Menezes, Paul C. van Oorschot, and Scott A. Vanstone. Hand-
book of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1996.
[19] Mehmet Kivanc¸ Mihc¸ak and Ramarathnam Venkatesan. New iterative
geometric methods for robust perceptual image hashing. In Digital
Rights Management Workshop, volume 2320 of LNCS, pages 13–21.
Springer, 2001.
[20] Vishal Monga. Perceptually Based Methods for Robust Image Hashing.
PhD thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, 2005.
[21] Christian Rathgeb and Andreas Uhl. A survey on biometric cryptosys-
tems and cancelable biometrics. EURASIP J. Information Security,
2011:3, 2011.
[22] Martin Steinebach, Huajian Liu, and York Yannikos. Forbild: efficient
robust image hashing. In Media Watermarking, Security, and Forensics,
volume 8303 of Proc. SPIE. SPIE, 2012.
[23] Yagiz Sutcu, Qiming Li, and Nasir D. Memon. Protecting biometric
templates with sketch: Theory and practice. IEEE Transactions on
Information Forensics and Security, 2(3-2):503–512, 2007.
[24] Bian Yang, Fan Gu, and Xiamu Niu. Block mean value based image
perceptual hashing. In IIH-MSP, pages 167–172. IEEE, 2006.
[25] Christoph Zauner. Implementation and benchmarking of perceptual im-
age hash functions. Master’s thesis, Upper Austria University of Applied
Sciences, 2010. http://www.phash.org/docs/pubs/thesis zauner.pdf.
84
